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Electronic funds transfer systems may be mak-
ing payroll depositing and bill paying easier for 
you, but they're raising difficult policy ques-
tions for the Federal Reserve System. The Fed 
now runs most of the nation's automated clear-
inghouses, which let banks exchange funds via 
electronic impulses on magnetic tape ("elec-
trons") instead of cumbersome paper checks. 
Should the Fed continue to run these new facil-
ities as it does traditional check clearing-
houses—mainly for member banks and free of 
charge? Or should other financial firms be 
allowed to use them too? If so, which firms? 
And should they have to pay to use them? How 
much? 
The Fed proposed some general answers to 
these questions last year: broaden indirect ac-
cess to clearinghouses somewhat, charge prices 
which encourage use of electronic clearing, and 
give Federal Reserve member banks a discount 
in return for the reserve funds they must keep. 
In making these proposals the Fed solicited 
comments from the financial community, but 
the U.S. Department of Justice responded with 
some very definite answers of its own. 
All financial firms should have equal access 
to clearing facilities, it said, and they should 
face equal prices for equal services, without re-
gard to irrelevant factors like Federal Reserve 
membership. The Fed definitely should charge 
for its clearing services and enough to cover all 
operating costs; that is, the Fed should run its 
clearinghouses like private businesses. In fact, 
the Justice Department said, the best thing the 
Fed could do for the clearing industry would be 
to get out of it and let private businesses take 
over. 
At the core of the Justice Department's 
argument is the principle which should guide 
not only the Fed's access and pricing policies 
but also its decisions to offer any good or service 
at all: economic efficiency. In most situations, 
competition working in the private marketplace 
does a reasonably good job of allocating re-
sources for the economy as efficiency pre-
scribes—producing goods and services at 
lowest cost and in the amounts society wants. 
So if the Fed wants to achieve efficiency gener-
ally, it can only justify getting involved in an in-
dustry by showing that competition among pri-
vate firms cannot operate properly and the Fed 
can help. When the Fed decides on these 
grounds that it must actually provide a good or 
service such as clearing, then its proper access 
and pricing policies are whatever is needed to 
achieve economic efficiency in that particular 
situation. 
Efficiency should be the Fed's objective* 
Few would argue with the suggestion that the 
Fed, as a public body, should ultimately try to 
achieve the greatest level of well-being for soci-
ety as a whole. In economic terms, the Fed 
should try to maximize social welfare. 
This concept, when used in an economic 
•Some believe the Fed must also consider the effects of its access and 
pricing policies on membership in the Federal Reserve System. But en-
couraging membership shouldn't overrule the primary goal of efficient 
pricing. Membership could be maintained through other means, for ex-
ample, paying banks interest on their reserves. 
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context, can be separated into two components: 
the efficiency of producing and distributing 
goods and services and the distribution of in-
come. Since the Fed has only indirect influence 
on income distribution, it should leave that to 
government tax and transfer policies. And in 
matters where the Fed has authority or direct 
interest, it should concentrate on achieving 
economic efficiency. 
"Economic efficiency" itself has two main 
aspects: technological efficiency and allocative 
efficiency. An outcome of a production or dis-
tribution process is technologically efficient if 
the quantity available of any particular good or 
service cannot be increased without decreasing 
the quantity available of at least one other good 
or service. An outcome is allocatively efficient if 
either the composition of total output by 
product or the distribution of goods among in-
dividuals cannot be changed without making at 
least one individual worse off. In a competitive 
economy, technological efficiency requires that 
given levels of goods and services be produced 
at least cost; allocative efficiency requires they 
be produced in the right proportions. This 
means for each good and service the cost of 
producing the last unit (marginal cost) must 
just equal what society is willing to pay for it. 
In summary, then, the Fed should pursue 
the objective of economic efficiency in order to 
best serve society. This means the Fed should 
strive to ensure that the economy's goods and 
services are being produced in the cheapest 
possible way and in the right proportions. 
Usually, leave the market alone 
For most goods and services the Fed need do 
nothing at all to reach its objective; just leave 
the market alone. For one of the most signifi-
cant results in theoretical economics is that per-
fect competition operating under a wide variety 
of conditions leads to economic efficiency. Each 
firm is motivated to achieve technological effi-
ciency in order to maximize its own profits; in-
dustries move to technological efficiency as 
more efficient firms drive out less efficient 
ones. The price system operating in the com-
petitive economy responds to people's tastes 
and costs of production and leads to allocative 
efficiency. The price of a good reflects what 
society is willing to pay for the last unit de-
manded, and this turns out to be exactly what it 
costs firms to produce that last unit. 
Competition, of course, does not always 
lead to economic efficiency. In certain situations 
efficiency requires either that private firms co-
operate in providing and pricing goods or that 
the government—possibly the Fed—impose a 
solution. It is only in these special situations, 
when neither competition nor private coopera-
tive ventures can be expected to work well, that 
the Fed should consider intervening in the pri-
vate marketplace. 
But just to show that the private market-
place isn't efficient in providing a certain good 
is not enough reason to intervene. The outcome 
must be shown to be better with intervention 
than without it. Even when the private market-
place clearly can't do the job properly, public 
authorities need a tremendous amount of in-
formation, knowledge, and skill before their in-
tervention can help. (Has our energy situation, 
for instance, been improved by federal govern-
ment intervention?) 
Two situations in which competition does 
not work properly and the Fed could possibly 
help are public goods and decreasing cost 
industries. 
A public good is something that once it is 
provided, no member of society can be excluded 
from sharing it. If a private firm tried to provide 
a public good and charge a price for it, too little 
of the good would be produced. That is because 
the price the firm could charge for the last unit 
sold is no greater than the benefit an individual 
buyer would get from it. But the benefit to soci-
ety of this last unit would be greater than the 
benefit to an individual since all members of 
society would share the increased output 
whether they paid for it or not. If a public good 
is to be provided in sufficient quantity, there-
fore, society must do it collectively and tax it-
self to cover the cost. National defense is the 
16 standard example of a public good; monetary 
policy might also fit into this category. 
Goods and services produced in a decreasing 
cost industry (sometimes called a "natural mo-
nopoly") cannot be provided or priced properly 
without some guidance from their customers or 
the government either. A decreasing cost in-
dustry is one in which the average cost of pro-
duction declines as output increases. To be 
technologically efficient, such an industry must 
consist of only one firm. That is, a single firm 
can produce all the goods in the industry at a 
lower cost than two or more firms could. 
If the single firm sought to maximize its own 
profits, it would restrict its output and charge a 
higher price than efficiency requires. But if the 
firm had to charge the allocatively efficient 
price equal to the cost of the last unit produced, 
it would lose money. So the firm's customers or 
the government must step in to ensure that the 
firm can price its goods or services as efficiently 
as possible and still survive. In addition to 
charging a unit price, this usually means impos-
ing some extra lump-sum charge or nondistort-
ing tax to cover the firm's operating loss. De-
veloping an efficient pricing scheme in these 
cases is usually a difficult, if not insoluble, 
problem. Public utilities are the standard ex-
amples of decreasing cost industries, but check 
and automated clearinghouses may also fit this 
description. 
Some (including people in the Fed) have 
argued that the Fed should also intervene in the 
private sector when in carrying out its legiti-
mate or assigned tasks it has developed special 
expertise and technological capabilities which 
allow it to produce certain goods and services 
more cheaply than can the private sector. This 
does not seem to be a valid argument for inter-
vention, however, because it does not assert 
that the price system cannot work properly. 
The argument maintains that technological 
efficiency would increase if the Fed entered a 
normal industry on the same basis as a private 
firm, pricing to maximize its profits, subject to 
the same taxes, laws, and other constraints 
faced by all other private firms in the industry. 
But why should the Fed do all that work when it 
could more simply provide its special knowl-
edge, experience, or equipment to the private 
sector and achieve the same economic result? 
In summary, until proven otherwise the Fed 
should assume that the private sector left un-
fettered can provide any good or service effi-
ciently. The Fed should intervene only when it 
can argue persuasively that because of special 
circumstances competition cannot operate to 
price goods and services properly, the private 
sector cannot solve this problem cooperatively, 
and Fed involvement will increase economic 
efficiency. 
How to intervene? 
After deciding that private industry cannot 
properly provide a certain good or service with-
out help, the Fed must then determine how it 
should intervene—should it regulate or oper-
ate? "Regulating" would mean letting private 
industry produce the good or service while the 
Fed influenced its demand or supply. "Oper-
ating" would mean producing the good or ser-
vice itself. 
While the question of which method to use 
is in most cases hard to answer, the Fed's 
guideline should still be economic efficiency: 
Which method will get it where it wants to go at 
the cheapest cost? 
Private industry, motivated by profits and 
disciplined by competition, can probably pro-
duce most products cheaper than can govern-
ment. And if private industry is allowed to cap-
ture some of the rewards from research and 
development, it likely will be more innovative 
and dynamic than government enterprise. 
But regulation requires costly information 
gathering and monitoring. And it may unavoid-
ably interfere with the incentive of private in-
dustry to minimize production costs. 
If regulation can be devised, therefore, 
which preserves the efficiency incentive of 
private industry and is relatively cheap to ad-
minister, that method should be used. Other-
17 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
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wise, government operation may be necessary. 
In order to choose to operate the Fed must ar-
gue that the probable loss in technological effi-
ciency when it produces will be less than the 
probable cost of regulation when private in-
dustry produces. 
Access and Pricing Policies 
Once the Fed identifies a good the private sec-
tor cannot provide efficiently, it has in a sense 
identified an area where the price system can-
not operate properly. And to intervene it is act-
ing as if it knows how the price system ought to 
operate. Thus, the Fed's access and pricing 
policies should be just what is required for eco-
nomic efficiency in these special circumstances. 
The access question really need not be dis-
cussed separately. A restrictive access policy is 
just a special kind of pricing policy, one that 
charges an infinite price to some group of po-
tential customers. Thus, the access question is 
part of the pricing question of whether to 
charge a different price per unit of service to 
different groups of potential customers. 
While the policy of charging different prices 
to different customers can be consistent with 
economic efficiency, the criteria for price dis-
crimination must be related to demand charac-
teristics of the customers. Two customers 
equally willing and able to pay for a good or ser-
vice should face the same price schedule. The 
Fed has no defense on economic efficiency 
grounds for charging different prices—or offer-
ing different access—to financial institutions 
based on the criterion of Federal Reserve Sys-
tem membership, for example. 
If the Fed intervenes because of a public 
good, it faces a severe problem in determining 
how much to provide and how to cover costs of 
production. It must seek a level of output for 
which the value to society of the last unit pro-
duced is just equal to its cost. Learning of the 
benefits society gets from public goods is tricky 
and usually requires some information about 
individual preferences. Once that is known, 
however, various tax schemes can be used to 
pay the costs of production. 
If the Fed intervenes in a decreasing cost in-
dustry, it does not have to worry about whether 
its prices will encourage or discourage competi-
tion from the private sector. A decreasing cost 
industry must have only one producer to achieve 
technological efficiency. The Fed need only be 
concerned with setting the price of the last unit 
sold equal to the cost of producing it and then 
determining some way to raise revenue to cover 
the operating loss. But, as mentioned earlier, 
this usually turns out to be a difficult problem. 
To illustrate, let's look at a hypothetical 
decreasing cost industry. In the accompanying 
table, columns 1 and 2 taken together repre-
sent an assumed standard downward-sloping 
demand curve: the demand for the industry's 
good increases as its price falls. Column 3 is the 
total revenue earned in the industry if the units 
of output in column 1 are sold at the price in 
column 2. 
Total cost as shown in column 4 assumes a 
start-up production cost of $4 and then a con-
stant production cost of $2 per unit. The cost of 
each additional unit produced is displayed in 
column 5. The cost of producing the first unit is 
$6, the start-up cost plus the cost per unit. Each 
additional unit can be produced at a cost of $2. 
A start-up cost coupled with a constant cost per 
unit implies decreasing average costs as shown 
in column 6. 
Column 7 computes the total profit of the 
industry at each output level by subtracting the 
total cost in column 4 from total revenue in 
column 3. 
The total cost schedule in column 4 is as-
sumed to be faced by any firm which wants to 
enter the industry. The calculations in columns 
5-7 implicitly assume that the industry has only 
one firm, but this is obviously the most efficient 
number. With only one firm in the industry, the 
start-up cost need be incurred only once. One 
firm, for example, can produce two units of the 
good at a total cost of $8. Two firms, each pro-
ducing one unit of the good, would do so at a 
total cost of $6 + $6 = $12. Total costs are 
therefore minimized in a decreasing cost in-
18 A Hypothetical Decreasing Cost Industry 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Total  Total Cost  Marginal Cost  Average 
Quantity  Price per Unit  Revenue  ($4 startup +  (change in  Cost  Total Profit 
Demanded  (assumed)  (1)x(2)  $2 per unit)  total cost)  (4) + (1)  (3)-(4) 
0  6  0  0  0  —  0 
1  5  5  6  6  6  -1 
2  4  8  8  2  4  0 
3  3  9  10  2  3J  -1 
4  2  8  12  2  3  -4 
5  1  5  14  2  21  -9 
dustry by having a single firm produce all the 
goods. 
So how should the goods and services be 
priced in this industry to achieve allocative effi-
ciency? 
Full-cost pricing won't work. At $4 per unit, 
two units of the good would be demanded, and 
total revenue and total cost would exactly bal-
ance. But at that level the value to consumers of 
the last unit produced would be $4 and the cost 
of producing it only $2. Since consumers would 
be better off to pay, say, $3 to get an extra unit 
produced and since the firm would receive 
more for that extra unit than its production cost, 
full-cost pricing is not allocatively efficient in 
this case; it results in too few goods being 
produced. 
Marginal-cost pricing alone won't work 
either. At a price of $2 per unit, four units of the 
good would be demanded, and the value to con-
sumers of the last unit produced ($2) would 
equal the cost of producing that unit ($2). This 
seems allocatively efficient, but at a price of $2 
the firm would lose $4. And so the problem: 
How can the firm make up the loss while not up-
setting the efficiency of marginal-cost pricing? 
Suppose now that at a price of $2 per unit 
customer A demands two units and customers 
B and C each demand one unit. One possible 
pricing scheme would be to charge $2 per unit 
and also a $1.33 flat fee for entry. This scheme 
doesn't seem to work, however. Customers 
faced with it would probably form a
1 'correspon-
dent" relationship to avoid the entry fee; that 
is, one customer would pay the entry fee, buy 
all four units, and distribute the goods to the 
other customers, and the firm still would not 
make up its loss. 
In order to combat this incentive, the size of 
the entry fee might be based on the quantity of 
goods a customer demands. Thus, the firm 
would charge $2 per unit, and charge entry fees 
of $2 to customer A and $1 to customers B and 
C. The customers, not being complete ignora-
muses, however, would quickly recognize that 
they were effectively being charged $3 a unit 
and demand less than the efficient amount. 
In this example, a perfectly efficient pricing 
scheme seems difficult to construct with a con-
stant price per unit, but it does seem possible 
with price discrimination based on willingness 
to pay. The firm could sell the goods one unit at 
a time in an auction. 
Given the hypothetical demand schedule, 
the firm would be able to get $5 for the first unit 
sold, $4 for the second, $3 for the third, and $2 
for the fourth. This pricing scheme would be al-
locatively efficient since the price for the last 
unit sold would equal the cost of producing it, 
and the total revenue from the sales ($5 + $4 + 
$3 + $2 = $14) would cover the total cost of 
production ($12). If the total revenue received 
19 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
Quarterly Review/Summer 1977 
Efficient pricing in a decreasing cost industry requires 
an extra charge to make up the firm's loss. 
Demand and cost curves for hypothetical decreasing cost industry 
Quantity demanded 
through this type of perfect price discrimination 
did not cover total production costs, the value of 
production would be less than the cost, and no 
goods should have been produced. 
Although an auction seems to result in effi-
cient pricing in this example, it seems ill-suited 
as a method of handling frequent, high-quantity 
sales, such as clearing services. In decreasing 
cost industries such as that, therefore, some 
other scheme must be used. 
In summary, the Fed's pricing policy for any 
good or service it provides must be defensible 
in terms of the Fed's objective of economic effi-
ciency. Different access or pricing policies 
based on criteria unrelated to demand charac-
teristics, such as Federal Reserve membership, 
cannot be defended on economic efficiency 
grounds. For a public good the Fed should con-
centrate on determining the level of output 
which best meets society's needs. It should set 
a zero unit price for that good and finance the 
cost of production from taxes. For a good pro-
duced in a decreasing cost industry, the Fed 
should set the price of the last unit sold equal to 
marginal cost and somehow assess an auxiliary, 
nondistorting charge or tax to cover the operat-
ing loss. 
Pricing Clearing Services 
As an example of how the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem could apply these general principles of ac-
cess and pricing, let's return to the clearing in-
dustry. The Fed first must determine whether it 
has a legitimate role to play in the provision of 
clearinghouse services (checks and electrons). 
To justify a role it must show that the private 
sector cannot provide these services efficiently 
alone and that Fed involvement can help. Its 
proper policies would then be to do whatever is 
required to achieve efficiency. 
A fairly strong case can be made that clear-
ing is a decreasing cost industry. 
On one level it can be argued that the pro-
duction costs of clearing resemble the cost 
schedule for the hypothetical industry dis-
cussed above. Clearing seems to have large set-
up costs (for computers, sorters, and communi-
cation networks, for example) and a low, rather 
constant cost per item cleared. The validity of 
this argument depends on empirical evidence, 
of course, but even if it is valid, the argument 
seems to apply about as well to private indus-
tries such as autos or steel as it does to 
clearing. 
On a deeper level, though, it can be argued 
that the clearing industry is unique. Imagine an 
economy with banks and other financial firms 
scattered about as in our economy and with one 
payments technology (checks), but where a 
clearing industry has not yet been developed. 
Given this clean slate, what would be the most 
efficient organization for the clearing industry? 
What would be best? 
While we can only speculate about the answer, 
the nature of transportation, production, and 
accounting costs suggests that the most effi-
cient organization would be a hierarchy of clear-
ing networks: local clearinghouses feeding into 
regional clearinghouses feeding into a national 
clearinghouse. And any market—local, region-
al, or national—would have only one clearing-
20 house. This last point is crucial. 
In any given market, banks and other finan-
cial firms which must devise a scheme for clear-
ing checks could enter into bilateral trading ar-
rangements. That is, firm A could settle with 
firm B and then with firm C and then with firm 
D and so on, and other firms could similarly 
settle their accounts. 
But a central check clearinghouse seems 
much more efficient. All checks could be cleared 
there, and debits and credits could be netted 
out and posted to accounts with the clearing-
house. Each firm would have to keep an account 
only with the clearinghouse; it would not need 
accounts with other financial firms. And each 
firm would have to spend much less on trans-
portation with a central clearinghouse than 
under bilateral trading arrangements. 
So each financial market would have at most 
one clearinghouse; it is hard to imagine two 
clearinghouses located next door to each other 
efficiently serving the same market and operat-
ing independently. Since this seems true no 
matter what the volume of checks cleared, it in-
dicates that check clearing is a decreasing cost 
industry. If this were not true, at larger and 
larger volumes two, three, or even more clear-
inghouses could easily compete in the same 
market. 
There do, then, seem to be valid reasons for 
viewing clearing as a decreasing cost industry. 
In each market in each level of a hierarchy of 
clearing networks, a single clearinghouse 
seems most efficient. Who should operate it? 
Without intervention by the Fed or some 
other public body, financial firms in each mar-
ket would probably enter into cooperative clear-
ing associations since competing clearing-
houses would be inefficient. Such associations 
would conceivably make it easy for members to 
collude and deny equal entry to other firms in 
the market. The associations might also make it 
possible for firms to restrict payment services 
at the clearinghouse level in order to restrict 
supply at the retail level. A restriction in supply 
would result in higher retail prices, and if the 
demand for payment services was sufficiently 
insensitive to price, it would raise the profits of 
the financial firms. So some government in-
volvement in the clearing industry might be 
necessary for economic efficiency. Does that 
justify Fed operation or regulation? 
I do not believe so. 
Private associations probably would be 
more efficient than the Fed in clearing pay-
ments and would better solve the difficult pric-
ing problem faced in this industry. The associa-
tions would most likely contract out the opera-
tion of the clearinghouses, and each established 
operator would face competition from other 
potential private operators. Although only one 
clearinghouse would operate at a time at any 
level of the hierarchy, private concerns would 
compete for the rights to operate that clearing-
house. A firm which developed a new and bet-
ter way to clear checks, for example, would win 
the rights to manage a clearinghouse and thus 
drive out the established operator. This process 
of innovation through competition for operation 
would be lost with Fed operation. 
With private associations operating the 
clearing industry, Fed regulation may also be 
unnecessary. The Justice Department could 
assume responsibility for providing an environ-
ment free of collusion and restrictive trade prac-
tices, as it does for other trade associations. 
What is realistic? 
Ideally, then, I argue that the Federal Reserve 
System should not be involved in the clearing 
industry at all. Realistically, however, the Fed 
already operates check clearinghouses and will 
probably become entrenched in automated 
clearinghouses. Given this involvement, the 
Fed's access and pricing policies should be 
made to achieve the greatest efficiency possible 
under the circumstances. 
The argument that the most efficient organ-
ization of the clearing industry would have only 
one clearinghouse serving each market implies 
that all financial firms in the industry have 
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equal access to that clearinghouse. Otherwise 
those firms being discriminated against would 
find it profitable to form their own clearing as-
sociations or choose circuitous routes to clear 
their payment items. Either practice would 
clearly be inefficient from the economy's view-
point. 
Efficient pricing in the clearing industry is 
more complicated than efficient access. The in-
dustry really has two payments technologies-
checks and electrons—both of which are char-
acterized by decreasing costs. At low volumes, 
clearing paper checks is relatively more effi-
cient than clearing electronic impulses on 
magnetic tapes, while the reverse is true at 
high volumes. If the Fed decides to operate 
clearinghouses for both types of payments at 
the national and regional levels and to allow co-
operative associations locally (as is probable, 
though not necessarily appropriate), how 
should the Fed price its services to promote 
technological and allocative efficiency? 
In order to achieve technological efficiency, 
any given level of demand for clearing services 
must be provided in the cheapest way possible. 
This implies that if checks and electrons are 
perfect substitutes as means of payments, only 
one technology should be used at a time; that 
is, the least-cost way would be to use only 
checks at low volumes of transactions and only 
electrons at high volumes. It would not be 
desirable, as some have suggested, to price 
automated clearing services below marginal 
cost in order to encourage electronic payments 
at low volumes. 
The two forms of payments are probably not 
perfect substitutes, however. Technological ef-
ficiency thus requires only that each type of 
clearing service be provided as cheaply as pos-
sible. There is still no reason to price in order to 
encourage the use of one type of payment at the 
expense of the other. Each type should be con-
sidered separately, and the Fed should simply 
price clearing of each type based on costs. 
As we have seen, though, allocatively effi-
cient pricing in a decreasing cost industry is not 
simple. And the clearing industry presents an 
additional new twist. Prices must not only be 
set so that the price of the last unit sold equals 
its production cost. Prices at each clearinghouse 
must also be set to ensure that the entire clear-
ing network is used efficiently. 
This means the Fed should not price clear-
ing services at marginal cost and cover its oper-
ating losses out of general tax revenues. Local 
private clearinghouses would then be at a 
disadvantage because they must charge a price 
that fully covers their costs. And financial firms 
would be encouraged to try to clear through the 
Fed some payments which could more effi-
ciently be cleared through local private clear-
inghouses. So it is important that the Fed some-
how charge enough to cover costs. 
The Fed should develop and implement a 
two-pronged pricing schedule for its clearing 
services: unit prices set equal to marginal costs 
and lump-sum user fees set at levels for which 
total revenues just cover total costs. The 
charges should be imposed in such a way that 
financial firms have neither the incentive nor 
the opportunity to use inefficient means to 
avoid them. 
Conclusion 
Pricing to achieve economic efficiency presents 
problems in a decreasing cost industry. But the 
Fed must try to solve them if it decides to 
continue operating clearinghouses. 
That decision would not be easy to justify, 
however. As the Justice Department recog-
nizes, the Fed should only be involved in an in-
dustry when it can argue conclusively that pri-
vate competition or cooperation will not work 
well. This has not yet been done for clearing— 
and many other Fed services. 
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